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Abstract Theories of counterfactuals agree on appealing to a relation of comparative
similarity, but disagree on the quantificational force of counterfactuals. We report on
two experiments testing the predictions of three main approaches: universal theories,
homogeneity theories, and single-world selection theories (plus supervaluations over
selection functions). The critical cases in our experiments were constructed so as to
discriminate between the three theories. Our results provide empirical support for
the selectional theories, while challenging the other two approaches.
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1 Introduction
On mainstream theories, counterfactuals like (1) exploit a relation of comparative
closeness between worlds (see Lewis 1973a,b, 1979). Via comparative closeness, we
can determine a set of antecedent-verifying worlds that functions as the domain of
quantification for the conditional. For example, (1) quantifies over the set of closest
worlds to the actual world where ticket #37 is bought.
(1) If ticket #37 was bought, it would win a prize.
At the same time, different theories disagree about the quantificational force of coun-
terfactuals. Three main views have gained prominence in the literature. One is the
classical theory of Lewis (1973a; 1973b) and Kratzer (2012), on which counterfac-
tuals are simply universal quantifiers over closest antecedent worlds. The second is
Stalnaker’s selectional theory (1968; 1981; 1984). On this theory, the semantics of
counterfactuals requires them to select a single closest antecedent world, and cases
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where there is no such a single world are handled via supervaluations. On the third
theory, counterfactuals are universal quantifiers, as on the Lewis-Kratzer view, but
they also enforce a homogeneity requirement (see von Fintel 1997, Schlenker 2004).
This requirement demands that either all antecedent worlds make the consequent
true, or else that all of them make the consequent false.
All three theories capture some basic data about counterfactuals. In addition,
the selectional theory and the homogeneity theory make analogous predictions for
unembedded cases. But embeddings of counterfactuals under certain quantifiers pull
apart the predictions of all three theories. This paper reports on two experiments
that investigate some of these cases. Our results provide empirical support for the
selectional theory and pose a challenge for the other two.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In §2, we discuss the three theories
in more detail, as well as the novel predictions we target. In §3–4, we report on two
experiments that tested these predictions. In §5, we discuss the results in relation to
the theoretical predictions. Finally, §7 concludes. Throughout the paper, we use the
traditional notation ‘A C’ as shorthand for the counterfactual If A, would C.
2 Background: counterfactuals and undefinedness
2.1 Three theories of counterfactuals
Counterfactual conditionals are standardly treated as modalized sentences whose
semantics appeals to a relation of comparative closeness (denoted by ‘’). Most
accounts agree on the general form of their truth conditions: A C is predicted to
be true just in case C is true in some relevant range of close A-verifying worlds.1 But
different accounts make different claims about the quantificational force associated
to counterfactuals. Here we review three prominent options.
2.1.1 Universal Theories
Accounts belonging in this family treat counterfactuals as universal quantifiers (see
Lewis 1973a,b and Kratzer 1986, 2012 for some classical representatives). Sim-
plifying somewhat, the schematic truth conditions that these accounts assign to a
counterfactual are in (2).2
1 There are some well-known dynamic variants of the static accounts that we present: for discussion,
see von Fintel 2001 and Gillies 2007. For our purposes, we can lump dynamic accounts with universal
theories, since they make analogous predictions about the relevant sentences.
2 The simplification consists in making the so-called limit assumption, which Lewis overtly disavows
(besides Lewis, see Kaufmann 2017 for discussion). Issues concerning the limit assumption are
irrelevant for our purposes.
2
Counterfactuals and undefinedness
(2) JA CKw, = true iff ∀w′: w′ ∈ maxw,(JAKw,), JCKw
′, = true
where maxw,(JAKw,) is the set of maximally −close worlds to w
To illustrate, suppose that Maria considered flipping a coin yesterday at noon, but
didn’t do it in the end, and suppose that we utter (3) in this context.
(3) If Maria had flipped the coin, it would have landed heads.
The truth conditions that the universal theories predict for (3) are in (4). On the
assumption that the closest worlds to the actual world involve a mixture of heads and
tails-worlds, (3) is thus predicted to be false in the suggested context.
(4) J(3)Kw, = true iff ∀w′: w′ ∈ maxw,(JflipKw,), JheadsKw
′, = true
2.1.2 Selectional Theories
On selectional theories, counterfactuals select a single closest antecedent-verifying
world (see Stalnaker 1968, 1981, 1984). A counterfactual is true if and only if
the selected world also verifies the consequent. Following Stalnaker, we state the
semantics using selection functions, i.e., functions of the form s : W ×P(W ) 7→W
mapping a pair of a proposition and an ‘input’ world to a selected world.3 On this
view, the truth conditions of a counterfactual are, schematically, the following:
(5) JA CKw,s = true iff JCKs(w,JAK),s = true
The selectional theory does not appeal directly to a notion of comparative closeness,
but talk of selection functions can be rephrased into talk of comparative closeness
(modulo background assumptions about the properties of the comparative closeness
relation): the selected world is the single closest world to the world of evaluation that
makes true the antecedent of a counterfactual.4
Without supplementation, the selectional theory runs into a well-known difficulty.
The selectional semantics requires that, for every antecedent and every world of
3 Here are the full conditions that Stalnaker imposes on selection functions:
i. If JAK is non-empty, s(w,A) ∈ JAK
ii. If s(w,A) = λ , then JAK =∅
(where λ is the absurd world, i.e., a world where every sentence is true)
iii. If w ∈ JAK, then s(w,A) = w
iv. For all A, A′: if s(w,A) ∈ JA′K and s(w,A′) ∈ JAK, then s(w,A) ∈ JA′K = s(w,A′) ∈ JAK
4 For discussion of this point, see Lewis 1973a, Chapter 2. The background assumption needed is that
the relation of comparative closeness induces a linear order on worlds.
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evaluation w, there is a single closest antecedent-world to w. As examples like (3)
suggest, however, this assumption is highly implausible: in a situation where Maria
is flipping a fair coin, it appears that some heads-worlds and some tails-worlds will
be tied for closeness, no matter what specific construal of closeness we adopt. In fact,
Stalnaker (1981; 1984) agrees that, in many cases, for some choice of antecedent
A and some world w, there won’t be a single closest A-world to w. He suggests
that this problem should be handled not in the semantics proper, but rather in the
metasemantics. Cases of this sort will be treated as cases where it is indeterminate
which selection function is the ‘right’ one. This kind of predicament can be modeled
via supervaluations.5
The idea behind supervaluations is the following. In cases like (3), there are
several selection functions that are equally plausible candidates for being the selection
function individuated by the context. Given this, wemay define notions of determinate
truth and determinate falsity by quantifying over these candidate selection functions.
More specifically, we define determinate truth as truth at all the 〈w,s〉 pairs, where s
is a candidate selection function at the relevant context; determinate falsity is defined
in an analogous fashion. Finally, we say that a sentence is undefined just in case it is
neither determinately true nor determinately false.6
A is determinately true (false) at c iff, for all 〈wc,s〉 such that s is a
candidate selection function at c, JAKw,s is true (false).
Note that determinate truth and determinate falsity at a context replace the clas-
sical Kaplanian notions of truth and falsity at a context (see Kaplan 1989). These
notions are not part of the compositional semantics proper. Rather, they apply after
the compositional computation of semantic value is complete. This will play an
important role in the way that the undefinedness of counterfactuals projects under
embeddings. For now, let us see how the account works by considering again (3):
(3) If Maria had flipped the coin, it would have landed heads.
Plausibly, there are several candidate selection functions for an utterance of (3). On
some of them, the selection function maps the world of evaluation and the antecedent
of (3) to a heads-world and, on some others, to a tails-world. On these assumptions,
(3) is thus predicted to be undefined. Therefore, we have a difference in predictions
here between the universal and the selectional theory.
5 Supervaluations were introduced by Van Fraassen in 1969. We also refer the reader to Fine 1975 for a
classical use of supervaluations to model vagueness.
6 On a number of views about indeterminacy, this terminology might be misleading, since A’s not being
determinately true is compatible with it being true (see Barnes & Williams 2011). We want to be




Homogeneity theories (von Fintel 1997, Schlenker 2004) have features in common
with both universal and selectional theories. Like universal theories, they treat coun-
terfactuals as universal quantifiers over closest antecedent worlds. Like selectional
theories, they assume that some counterfactuals will be undefined. Crucially, how-
ever, in this case undefinedness results from a definedness condition that requires
the domain of quantification of the counterfactual to be homogeneous with respect
to the consequent. That is, the definedness condition requires that either all closest
antecedent-worlds are consequent-worlds, or else that none are.7 Below are the
schematic truth conditions for a counterfactual on this account:
(6) JACKw, =

defined iff either ∀w′: w′ ∈ maxw,(JAKw,), JCKw
′, = true
or ∀w′: w′ ∈ maxw,(JAKw,), JCKw
′, = false
true iff ∀w′: w′ ∈ maxw,(JAKw,), JCKw
′, = true
The appeal to a definedness condition is an attempt at reproducing some desirable
logical features of selectional semantics. In particular, like the selectional theory
(and unlike the universal theory), the homogeneity theory vindicates the negation
swap inferences reported and illustrated by the pair in (7).8
(7) Negation swap ¬(A C)  A ¬C
a. It’s not the case that, if Maria had flipped the coin, the coin would have
landed tails.
b. If Maria had flipped the coin, the coin would not have landed tails.
At the same time, homogeneity theories also capture some of the advantages of
universal theories. For example, they correctly predict that would-counterfactuals
are duals of might-counterfactuals. Thus for instance, they correctly predict the
incompatibility of the counterfactuals in (8).
(8) a. If Maria had flipped the coin, the coin would have landed tails.
b. If Maria had flipped the coin, the coin might not have landed tails.
Given this background, consider again our benchmark example (3):
(3) If Maria had flipped the coin, it would have landed heads.
On the assumption that some heads-worlds and some tails-worlds are equally
close, homogeneity theories predict that the homogeneity requirement is not satisfied
7 As Schlenker 2004 emphasizes, this proposal is motivated by a suggestive analogy with the behavior
of plural definite phrases like the girls.
8 Given that the semantics of conditionals is trivalent, the relevant notion of entailment here is Strawson-
entailment. See von Fintel 1999 for discussion.
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for (3), and hence the sentence is undefined. Thus, selectional and homogeneity
theories yield the same verdict for (3). In fact, provided that we make symmetrical
assumptions about what worlds are tied for closeness and what selection functions
are admissible, the two theories will always agree on their verdicts for unembedded
conditionals. Importantly for our purposes, however, there is a key difference between
the way the two families of theories treat undefinedness. On selectional theories, the
compositional semantics is fully bivalent, and undefinedness only emerges when we
define truth at a context. Conversely, homogeneity theories are trivalent. Hence we
have constituents of sentences whose semantic value is undefined. As a result, on this
theory, we need a projection algorithm which tells us in what way the undefinedness
of simpler expressions affects the definedness of complex expressions.
The projection of homogeneity is a matter of live debate in the literature (see
Križ 2015, Križ & Chemla 2015 among others for discussion). For our purposes,
however, this debate is not central. As we point out below, the test case that we will
focus on is one where all projection theories in the literature are in agreement.
2.2 Global vs Local undefinedness: diverging predictions
The key difference between supervaluational and homogeneity theories concerns the
stage at which undefinedness emerges. On the supervaluational view, undefinedness
emerges at the global level. A sentence A is undefined at c iff, at c, there are candidate
selection functions s1 and s2 such that A is true relative to 〈w,s1〉 and false relative
to 〈w,s2〉. But, at all compositional stages, the semantics is indistiguishable from
a standard bivalent theory. Conversely, on the homogeneity view, homogeneity
emerges at the local level. This means that clauses that are embedded in a complex
sentence are undefined if the homogeneity requirement is not satisfied.
Two theories that differ in this respect will make identical predictions for un-
embedded counterfactuals.9 However, we can pull apart their predictions when we
consider embeddings under certain operators. For the purposes of this paper, we will
focus on embeddings under negative universal determiner phrases like no ticket. Let
us introduce our example. Consider the following scenario:
There is a raffle where prize-winning tickets are selected via a random
draw among all the tickets bought. Only some of the tickets among
those bought will win a prize, and any ticket has the same chance of
winning and losing.
Consider first a simple counterfactual about a random ticket in the lot, like (9):10
9 As we mentioned above, this holds provided that we make analogous assumption about comparative
closeness and selection functions in both cases.
10 As Simon Goldstein and Angelika Kratzer have independently pointed out to us, (9) is not a contrary-
6
Counterfactuals and undefinedness
(9) If ticket #37 was bought, it would win a prize.
(9) is predicted to be undefined by both supervaluational and homogeneity theories,
on plausible assumption about closeness. To explain why, let us first lay out the
relevant assumptions about selection/closeness. We assume that, in the relevant
scenario, all candidate selection functions map the world of evaluation and the
antecedent of (9) to worlds where some but not all of the tickets win. Among the
worlds in this set, some are worlds where ticket #37 wins, and some are worlds where
ticket #37 loses. We can rephrase this point in terms of comparative closeness: all
worlds in the relevant set of closest worlds are worlds where some but not all tickets
win. Within this set, some of these worlds are worlds where #37 wins, and some are
worlds where #37 loses.
It is easy to see how these assumptions lead to undefinedness. Here is the
prediction of the supervaluational theory:
(10) (9) is undefined at c iff for some candidate selection functions s1 and s2
compatible with c, [[(9)]]w,s1 = true and [[(9)]]w,s2 = false
Since by assumption there are two such selection functions, (9) is undefined at the
relevant context. And here is the prediction of the homogeneity theory:
(11) [[(9)]]〈w,〉 = undefined iff
(i) ∃w′: w′ ∈ maxw,(J#37 boughtKw,), J#37 winKw
′, = true, and
(ii) ∃w′: w′ ∈ maxw,(J#37 boughtKw,), J#37 winKw
′, = false
That is, (9) is undefined if in some closest worlds where ticket #37 is bought the
ticket wins, and in some closest worlds where ticket #37 is bought the ticket loses.
Since this condition holds, (9) is again predicted to be undefined.
Let us now consider a more complex sentence. Holding fixed the raffle scenario
above, consider the following sentence:
(12) No ticket would win a prize if it was bought.
Unlike (9), (12) pulls apart the predictions of the two theories. To explain why, let
us again make some plausible assumptions about selection. We assume that, given
the functioning of the raffle, worlds where some of the tickets win and some of the
tickets lose are closer than all other worlds (let us call them ‘win-some-lose-some’
worlds). In terms of selection function, we assume that, all candidate selection
to-fact conditional strictly speaking, but rather a so-called future-less-vivid conditional, i.e., it concerns
a future event. We are assuming here that would has analogous quantificational force in future-less-
vivid and contrary-to-fact conditionals. We plan on running follow-up experiments on contrary-to-fact
conditionals in the next phase of the project.
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functions in the context will map counterfactuals to a win-some-lose-some world,
unless the antecedent of a counterfactual explicitly contradicts this. Consider first
the supervaluational theory. We have, again:
(13) (12) is undefined at c iff for some candidate s1 and s2 compatible with c,
[[(12)]]w,s1 = true and [[(12)]]w,s2 = false
In this case, (12) is predicted to be defined. Indeed, all candidate selection functions
take us to a win-some-lose-some world. Hence, on all of them, (12) is evaluated as
false. As a result, the supervaluational theory predicts that (12) has a determinate
truth value, and that it is false.
Holding fixed the assumptions about closeness, the homogeneity theory makes
a different prediction. This theory exploits a trivalent compositional semantics, so
we need to determine the definedness conditions for (12) on a compositional basis.
First, note that (12) has the structure in (14):
(14) No ticketx [[if x was bought][x would win a prize]]
From our discussion of (9), we know that, for all values of x, the embedded clause
if x was bought, x would win a prize is undefined. To get definedness conditions for
the full sentence, we need to determine how undefinedness projects under negative
determiner phrases like no ticket. The literature includes two main options (see Križ
2015, Križ & Chemla 2015; see also George 2008, Fox 2012, Mandelkern 2016 for a
corresponding debate related to presupposition projection):
• Existential projection. Nox[F(x)][G(x)] is defined iff, for at least one object
o in the domain of quantification, F(o)∧G(o) is defined.
• Universal projection. Nox[F(x)][G(x)] is defined iff, for every object o in
the domain of quantification, F(o)∧G(o) is defined.
For our current purposes, this choice is irrelevant. As we pointed out, the open
sentence embedded under No ticket in (12) is false for all objects in the domain. So,
no matter what projection algorithm we choose, (12) is predicted to be undefined.
2.3 Interim summary
In this section, we have introduced three families of theories of counterfactuals:
universal, selectional, and homogeneity theories. Both selectional and homogeneity
theories predict that some counterfactuals are undefined. Moreovoer, the two yield
analogous predictions for unembedded counterfactuals like (9), repeated below. At
the same time, they disagree for at least some cases of embeddings. In particular,
they disagree about examples where counterfactuals are embedded under negative
8
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Table 1 Predictions of the three approaches for the unembedded case in (9) and
the negative quantifier case in (12).
determiner phrases, as in (12). Finally, universal theories predict that (9) is false,
while (12) is true. These predictions are summarized in Table 1. In the next sections,
we report on two experiments designed to test these predictions, and adjudicate
between the three theories at hand.
(9) If ticket #37 was bought, it would win a prize.
(12) No ticket would win a prize if it was bought.
3 Experiment 1
Detecting by experimental means the failure of a sentence to be either true or false
is not an easy task, and various experimental options have been explored in the
previous literature toward this end (see Križ & Chemla 2015 for discussion).11 The
two experiments reported in this paper used for these purposes a graded acceptability
task, much in the spirit of Ripley (2009). Participants were presented with items
like the one in Figure 1. Each item involved a context, presented through a vignette,
and a target sentence, in bold font. Participants had to assess the extent to which the
sentence was true or false in the suggested context. They reported their judgments
by setting a slider tooltip along a scale going from ‘Completely false’ (left anchor) to
‘Completely true’ (right anchor). In the critical conditions, sentences like (9) and
(12) were paired with contexts in which only part of the tickets bought would win a
prize, as in the example in Figure 1. We hypothesized that, if these items give rise
to gap judgments, participants should set the slider toward the middle of the scale;
conversely, if these items give rise to clearly true or false judgments, participants
should move the slider away from the middle, closer to the extreme values.
11 Other experimental options include, among others, independent evaluation of truth and falsity (Križ
& Chemla 2015: experiments A1-3), binary judgments supplemented with independent processing
measures (Schwarz 2016), ternary judgments (Abrusán & Szendröi 2012; Alxatib & Pelletier 2009;
Tieu, Bill & Romoli 2019) and multiple unordered choices (Serchuk, Hargreaves & Zach 2011).
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Figure 1 Example item illustrating the experimental display seen by the partici-
pants in our experiments. This item is an example of a positive target
sentence in the mixed-context in Experiment 1.
3.1 Participants
100 participants were recruited through Prolific and were paid £1.2 for their participa-
tion. Of these, 1 was removed prior to analyses because they did not declare English
as their native language. The data of the remaining 99 were included in the analyses
(47 female, average age 35.9 years). All participants gave written informed consent
to the processing of their personal information for the purposes of this study. All
data were collected and stored in accordance with the provisions of Data Protection
Act 2018, the UK’s implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation.
3.2 Materials
Each item consisted of a short context followed by a test sentence (see Figure 1).
Each context described the working of one of three kinds of raffles: (i) one in which
all the tickets bought win a prize (all-context), (ii) one in which only half of the
tickets bought win a prize (mixed-context), and (iii) one in which none of the tickets
bought win a prize (none-context), as illustrated in (15)-(17).
(15) All-context
The tickets for the orange raffle are now for sale. It is the 50th anniversary of
this raffle and the organizers want all participants to be content: at the end of
the ticket sales, every ticket that has been bought is going to win a prize.
(16) Mixed-context
The tickets for the yellow raffle are now for sale. The yellow raffle works as
follows. At the end of the ticket sales, there will be a random draw: half of
10
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the tickets that have been bought are going to not win anything, and the other
half will win a prize.
(17) None-context
The tickets for the red raffle are now for sale. But the red raffle is rigged: at
the end of the ticket sales, none of the tickets that have been bought are going
to win a prize.
Test sentences involved two types of targets: simple counterfactuals (positive) and
counterfactuals embedded under no ticket (negative), as shown in (18). For each
target, a corresponding control was included in the study, (19). Crucially, these
control sentences are not predicted on any approach to give rise to undefinedness,
unlike our targets. Thus, they were expected to be judged as false in the critical
conditions for the targets, i.e., when evaluated relative to the mixed-context.
(18) Target sentences
a. If ticket #37 was bought, it would win a prize. positive
b. No ticket would win a prize, if it was bought. negative
(19) Control sentences
a. If ticket #37 was bought, it would have to win a prize. positive
b. No ticket could win a prize, if it was bought. negative
Crossing contexts and sentence types gave rise to 3× 4 = 12 test items. 12 filler
items were further included in the study to diversify the content of the sentences
presented to participants. Filler items involved contexts similar to those used in the
test items, but were followed by non-counterfactual sentences.
3.3 Procedure
In the instructions, participants were told that they would read short stories, followed
by a sentence, and that their task would be to assess the extent to which the sentence
was true or false in the context of the story. They were next introduced to the response
scale used in the study: they were instructed to move the slider to the right if they
judged the sentence as completely true, to the left if they judged it as completely
false, and to the middle if they found it neither completely false, nor completely true.
Participants were encouraged to use all the flexibility of the slider to represent at best
their intuitions about each sentence. After the instructions, the experiment started
with 2 (unannounced) practice trials and then continued with the 24 experimental
items (12 test+12 filler), which were presented in random order.
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3.4 Data analysis
Participants’ ratings were coded as the position of the slider on the scale, from 0% for
‘Completely false’ to 100% for ‘Completely true’. We analysed the data by modeling
ratings using linear mixed-effects models fit by restricted maximum likelihood.
Analyses were conducted using the lme4 (Bates, Maechler & Bolker 2011) and
lmerTest packages, and languageR libraries for the R statistics program.
3.5 Results
Figure 2 shows the mean ratings to the test items. Responses to the control conditions
were as expected: participants uniformly accepted the positive sentences in the
all-context and the negative ones in the none-context (all ratings > 88%), and they
uniformly rejected the positive sentences in the none-context and the negative
ones in the all-context (all ratings < 7%). Turning now to the critical conditions,
the positive target sentences gave rise in the mixed-context to intermediate ratings
(M = 47%, 95% CI[50,44]), closer to the midpoint of the scale than their corre-
sponding controls (M = 38%, 95% CI[42,34]). On the other hand, the negative
target sentences gave rise in this same context to very low ratings (M = 12%, 95%
CI[16,8]), just like their corresponding controls (M = 13%, 95% CI[17,9]). To
evaluate the differences between positive and negative sentences, we examined
the effects of sentence type and status on participants’ ratings in the mixed-context.
The model included Sentence (2 levels: Positive, Negative), Status (2 levels: Target,
Control) and their interaction as fixed effects, a random effect for subject and a ran-
dom slope for Sentence per subject.12 The model showed a main effect of Sentence
(Negative<Positive, β =−35, p < .001), a main effect of Status (Control<Target,
β =−9, p < .001) as well as a significant interaction between both factors (β = 10,
p < .001) such that the difference in ratings between Target and Control was greater
for the positive than the negative sentences in the mixed-context.
3.6 Discussion
Results show that, in the critical mixed-context, simple counterfactuals (positive)
received intermediate ratings whereas counterfactuals embedded under no (negative)
received very low ratings. If our interpretation of the task is correct, these results
indicate that the former gave rise to gap judgments while the latter gave rise to
judgments of falsity. These findings are in line with the predictions of the selectional
theories while they are unexpected on the universal and homogeneity theories.























Responses to the test items
Figure 2 Mean rating to the test items in Experiment 1 as a function of the type of
Context. The dotted line represents the midpoint of the response scale
and error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
4 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed at assessing both the reliability of the results from Experiment 1
and the adequacy of our linking hypothesis.
4.1 Participants
80 participants were recruited through Prolific and were paid £1.2 for their partici-
pation. The data from all the participants were included in the analyses (36 female,
average age 34.8 years). The consent and data collection procedures were the same
as in Experiment 1.
4.2 Materials
The materials and method used in Experiment 2 were the same as in Experiment 1,
except for the following two changes. First, the positive sentences in Experiment 2
were created using the frames in (20), where #X was a numeric value between 1
and 100 pseudo-randomly generated so as to be unique for each instance of these
sentences. We made this modification to prevent participants from focusing on a
particular ticket number as well as to make the choice of the ticket mentioned in
these sentences look more random. In addition, we modified the formulation of the
positive control in an attempt to provide a better baseline for the positive target.
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(20) Positive sentences
Consider a random ticket, say ticket #X:
a. If ticket #X was bought, it would win a prize. Target
b. If ticket #X was bought, necessarily, it would win a prize. Control
Second, the content of the mixed-context was minimally altered so as to not make
reference to a specific ratio (e.g., half of the tickets), as illustrated in (21). We made
this modification to avoid an interpretation of intermediate ratings as matching the
proportion of ticket bought (or the probability of a ticket being a winning ticket).
(21) Mixed-context
The tickets for the yellow raffle are now for sale. The yellow raffle works as
follows. At the end of the ticket sales, there will be a random draw: only some
of the tickets that have been bought will win a prize.
The rest of the design of Experiment 2 (number of test items, list of fillers, etc.) was
identical to that of Experiment 1 in all relevant respects.
4.3 Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 (see Section 3.3 for details).
4.4 Data analysis
The data were analysed using the data analysis pipelines created to analyse the data
from Experiment 1. The results from Experiments 1 & 2 are thus directly comparable.
4.5 Results
Figure 3 shows the mean ratings to the test items. The patterns of ratings for the
control conditions (i.e., none-context and all-context) and the critical conditions
(i.e., mixed-context) were essentially the same as those observed in Experiment 1.
In particular, the positive target received a middle-range rating (M = 46%, 95%
CI[50,41]), closer to the midpoint of the scale than its control (M = 35%, 95%
CI[41,30]), while the negative target received a low-range rating (M = 13%, 95%
CI[18,9]), just like its control (M = 11%, 95% CI[15,6]). As in Experiment 1, we
examined the effects and interaction of Sentence and Status on participants’ ratings in
the mixed-context. The model showed a main effect of Sentence (Negative<Positive,
β =−32, p < .001), a main effect of Status (Control<Target, β =−10, p < .001)























Responses to the test items
Figure 3 Mean rating to the test items in Experiment 2 as a function of the type of
Context. The dotted line represents the midpoint of the response scale
and error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
4.6 Discussion
Experiment 2 yielded similar results as Experiment 1. Interestingly, we found that
the positive target still received middle ratings in the novel mixed-context where no
specific ratio was mentioned, unlike the mixed-context used in Experiment 1. We
take this replication to support the hypothesis that the midpoint of the response scale
was used by participants as a reference point for categorizing sentences that they
perceived as neither completely true, nor completely false.
5 General discussion
In both experiments, we found clear middle ratings for the positive target in the
mixed-context. These ratings were reliably different from those for their corre-
sponding controls. This finding is in line with the predictions of selectional and
homogeneity theories, while it is challenging for universal theories. In fact, it con-
firms the conclusion of several authors who have argued against universal theories
for various kinds of conditionals (see for instance Klinedinst 2011).
In both experiments, we also found that the endorsement rate for the negative
target in the mixed-context was overall very low and no different from that of their
corresponding control. This suggests that both target and control negative sen-
tences were essentially judged false in these contexts. This finding is consistent with
selectional theories, but is a challenge for both homogeneity and universal theories.
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In summary, our experimental results provide a clear argument for the selectional
theory, and against both universal and homogeneity theories. At the very least, the
latter have to supplement the semantics of counterfactuals with some additional
mechanism to account for our data.
Before concluding, we should briefly emphasize a surprising aspect of our results.
We found in both experiments that the positive control, involving either have to or
necessarily, were rated significantly lower than the positive target. Nonetheless,
ratings for these sentences were distinctly higher than what it should be if these
sentences were robustly judged false by participants (compare with negative control
for instance). We leave this observation as an open puzzle for now.
6 Alternative theories
In this section, we briefly sketch two additional theoretical options which are in
principle compatible with our results.
The implicature approach. Bassi & Bar-Lev (2016) propose an implicature-based
account of bare conditionals. They don’t discuss counterfactuals directly, but their
approach can easily be extended to the latter. Bassi & Bar-Lev’s idea is that condi-
tionals have existential force on their basic meaning, as in (22), and that this meaning
is strengthened to a universal one via implicature, as in (23). The details of how this
implicature comes about are not important for us; we merely mark the strengthened
sentence via an ‘IMP’ operator.
(22) a. If ticket #37 was bought, it would win a prize
b. ∃w′: w′ ∈ maxw,(JAKw,),JCKw
′, = true
(23) a. IMP [If ticket #37 was bought, it would win a prize]
b. ∀w′: w′ ∈ maxw,(JAKw,),JCKw
′, = true
In unembedded cases, the strengthened meaning tends to be the prominent one, if not
the only possible one. But the basic meaning should resurface in environments where
implicatures tend not to arise, like in downward entailing contexts. This predicts
that sentences like (24) should mean that, for every ticket x, there is no closest world
where ticket x is bought such that ticket x wins in that world. These truth conditions
are false in our mixed contexts.
(24) a. None of the tickets would win a prize if it was bought.
b. ¬∃x[∃w′: w′ ∈ maxw,(JPxKw,),JQxKw
′, = true]
Hence, the implicature approach predicts our results for the negative conditions.
In addition, the intermediate ratings observed for the positive ones are in line with
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what is generally found for scalar implicatures with this type of measures (see Tieu
et al. (2019); Renans, Romoli, Makri, Tieu, de Vries, Folli & Tsoulas (2017); Marty,
Chemla & Spector (2015) among others).13
In sum, just like the selectional approach, the implicature approach is compatible
with our results. The two approaches could be distinguished via further embeddings,
like for instance under disjunction, but we must leave an investigation of these other
embeddings to future work.
Homogeneity and QUD. The second approach supplements the homogeneity
theory with a pragmatic mechanism involving a question under discussion, making
its predictions consistent with our data.14
This approach builds on an analogous idea in the literature on plural definites,
which are the paradigmatic case for homogeneity-based accounts. The main idea
is that propositions with extension gaps depend for their evaluation on the current
Question Under Discussion (QUD). In particular, if the QUD of the context lumps
the worlds where the proposition is undefined with those where it is true, then the
proposition can be judged as ‘true enough’ (see Križ 2015; Križ 2016; Champollion,
Bumford & Henderson 2019). To illustrate the point, consider (25) and assume that
it is associated with a trivalent proposition which is true when all windows are open,
false when none of them is, and undefined otherwise. The sentence is thus predicted
to be undefined in a context in which only some of the windows are open. Now,
imagine that the QUD of the context is whether any of the windows are open (e.g.,
imagine that a storm is coming, and we need to decide whether we should go back
home to close any windows that might be open). The partition associated with this
QUD lumps together the cases in which all windows are open and those in which only
13 One way to make this observation more precise is to hypothesize that, in cases where implicatures
are possible (i.e., in upward entailing contexts) and the literal and strengthened meanings lead to
conflicting responses, participants will tend to look for a middle ground, e.g., select an intermediate
response (see Bar-Lev 2020 for similar discussion in relation to judgments about plural definites, for
which he also provides an implicature-based approach).
14 Thanks to Lucas Champollion for extremely helpful discussion on this subsection.
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some of them are. Given this QUD, (25) would be now judged as ‘true enough’.15
(25) The windows are open.
At first blush, this idea could be extended to our scenario. The homogeneity
theorist could hypothesize that, when judging our negative target items, participants
accommodated a QUD that lumps worlds where the counterfactual is undefined with
worlds where the counterfactual is false. On this hypothesis, one could argue that
our participants judged the sentence ‘false enough’ and marked it as false in the
experiment. This is a conceivable strategy for the homogeneity approach. Yet it
leaves open a number of substantial questions. First, why do almost all participants
accommodate such a QUD (and not, say, a QUD that lumps undefinedness and true
together)? Second, why is this QUD accommodated only for the negative conditions,
and not for the positive ones? Overall, while this idea seems worth developing,
it needs to be supplemented with a principled pragmatic story about why speakers
accommodate the right QUD in the context. In principle, such an account could be
tested experimentally, for instance by introducing a context where a QUD is stated
explicitly. We must also leave an investigation of this idea to future work.
7 Conclusion
We reported on two experiments testing the predictions of three major families of
theories of counterfactuals: universal, selectional, and homogeneity theories. The
critical cases in our experiments were constructed so as to discriminate between the
key predictions of these three theories. Our findings support selectional theories and
challenge universal and homogeneity theories.
15 Another way whereby homogeneity can be removed has to do with the presence of certain items.
Thus for instance, sentences like those in (i) exhibit the expected pattern given homogeneity: both
(ia) and its negation, (ib), are judged neither true nor false in contexts in which some but not all of the
students left. By contrast, their counterparts with all in (iia) and (iib) are both judged false in such
contexts (Križ & Chemla 2015).
(i) a. The students left.
b. The students didn’t leave.
(ii) a. All the students left.
b. All the students didn’t leave.
We used in fact such a strategy to construct our control items for the positive cases, e.g., we used
necessarily, which was supposed to play the same role as all (Schlenker 2004). Crucially, however,
our targets did not contain any corresponding item that could serve as a homogeneity remover. In
particular, we know from the literature on definites that quantifiers like none remove homogeneity
only with respect to the argument position that they are filling. With a quantifier in subject position, a
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